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ABSTRACT. Experiments are conducted with various purposes in mind including theory testing,
mechanism design and measurement of individual characteristics. In each case a careful researcher is
constrained in the experimental design by prior considerations imposed either by theory, common
sense or past results. We argue that the integration of the design with these elements needs to be
taken even further. We view all these elements that make up the body of research methodology in
experimental economics as mutually dependant and therefore take a systematic approach to the
design of our experimental research program. Rather than drawing inferences from individual
experiments or theories as if they were independent constructs, and then using the findings from
one to attack the other, we recognize the need to constrain the inferences from one by the
inferences from the other. Any data generated by an experiment needs to be interpreted jointly with
considerations from theory, common sense, complementary data, econometric methods and
expected applications. We illustrate this systematic approach by reference to a research program
centered on large artefactual field experiments we have conducted in Denmark. An important
contribution that grew out of our work is the complementarity between lab and field experiments. 
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1 There is a growing literature of experiments performed outside of university research laboratories,
building on the pioneering work of Peter Bohm over many years, starting in the 1970s. Dufwenberg and
Harrison [2008; p.214ff.] provide a posthumous appreciation of his motivation: “Peter was drawn to conduct
field experiments long before laboratory experiments had become a staple in the methodological arsenal of
economists. Just as some experimentalists do not comprehend why one would ask questions with no real
economic consequences, or care too much about the responses to such questions, Peter began doing field
experiments simply because they answered the questions he was interested in. He did not come to field
experiments because of any frustration with lab experiments, or from any long methodological angst about
laboratory experiments: it was just obvious to him that experiments needed field referents to be interesting.
He later became interested in the methodological differences between laboratory and field experiments, well
after his own pioneering contributions to the later had been published.” Due to the great variety of such
experiments with respect to procedures, contexts and participant pools there has been a refinement of the
field-lab terminology to include modifiers such as “artefactual.” We will restrict our discussions to two kinds
of experiments only: the traditional research laboratory using convenient and low cost student samples, and
the artefactual field experiment that employs samples from populations not restricted to students. In these
latter experiments the tasks are similar to those presented to students but often have to be adjusted to the
perceptual and conceptual needs of the subject pool. Here we will simply use the label “lab” when referring to
experiments we conduct on student samples and “field” to those conducted on samples from more
heterogeneous field populations.
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Experiments are conducted with various purposes in mind including theory testing,
mechanism design and measurement of individual characteristics. In each case a careful researcher is
constrained in the experimental design by prior considerations imposed either by theory, common
sense or past results. We argue that the integration of the design with these elements needs to be
taken even further. We view all these elements that make up the body of research methodology in
experimental economics as mutually dependant and therefore take a systematic approach to the
design of our experimental research program. Rather than drawing inferences from individual
experiments or theories as if they were independent constructs, and then using the findings from
one to attack the other, we recognize the need to constrain the inferences from one by the
inferences from the other. Any data generated by an experiment needs to be interpreted jointly with
considerations from theory, common sense, complementary data, econometric methods and
expected applications.
We illustrate this systematic approach by reference to a research program centered on large
artefactual field experiments we have conducted in Denmark.1 The motivation for our research was
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to generate measures of household and individual characteristics for use in a range of policy
valuations. An important contribution that grew out of our work is the complementarity of lab and
field experiments.
One such characteristic was the risk preferences of representative Danish residents.
Predicted welfare effects from policy changes are always uncertain, in part because of imprecisely
known parameter values in the policy simulation models used. We introduce the term “policy
lottery” to refer to such uncertainties over the predicted policy effects. In light of these uncertainties,
we argue that the welfare impact calculated for various households should reflect their risk attitudes.
When comparing policies with similar expected benefits but with differences in the uncertainty over
those predicted effects, a risk averse household would prefer the policy with less uncertain effects to
that with more. Including measures of risk attitudes in policy evaluations can therefore have
important implications for inferences about the distribution of welfare effects. This is a significant
improvement over the standard practice in policy evaluations that either assume risk neutrality or
some arbitrarily selected risk coefficient employed uniformly over all household types. Our
dominating justification for the expense of going out in the field derived from the policy need to
provide measures for households and individuals that are representative of the general Danish
population. 
An instrumental part of our research program was the inclusion of a number of
complementary lab experiments conducted at a much lower cost because of the use of convenience
subject pools: students. Due to the lower cost we could conduct a wider range of robustness tests
varying elicitation instruments and procedures, but because we sampled from a more restricted
population these results are not by themselves informative to the policy applications we have in
mind. Nevertheless, the results obtained from such convenience samples can be used to condition
the inferences drawn from the observations on the field sample. 
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Another aspect of the systematic approach was to use several theoretical considerations to
guide our experimental design from the start. One important characteristic that we measure is the
discount rate of individuals across various household types. Theory is quite clear that what is being
discounted is not the money stream but the stream of utility that derives from that money.
Recognition of this fact had an influence not only on the inclusion of tasks incorporating both risk
and time manipulations but also on the econometric strategy of joint estimation. The joint
estimation approach leads to estimates of risk attitudes that are consistent with the estimated
discount rates and vice versa.
Finally, the systematic approach we advocate encourages the use of common sense
constraints on the inferences drawn from the data. For example, many structural model
specifications suffer from inflexibility globally so that they provide poor predictions on domains
outside the one on which the data was generated. The Constant Relative Risk Aversion function, for
example, if estimated on small stakes can make predictions on large stakes that may appear
ridiculous. The same may even be the case for the more flexible Expo-power function if estimated
on a stake domain where the income effect is negligible. Inferences drawn from estimations using
restrictive domains and restrictive specifications must therefore be constrained with common sense
constraints on their applicability.
In section 1 we introduce the concept of policy lotteries, giving a few examples. In section 2
we discuss how we draw inferences about risk attitudes using our systematic approach that includes
conditioning these inferences on smaller scale lab experiments, on sample selection effects and
elicitation methods, on econometric and statistical strategies such as sampling frame and structural
estimation approaches, and on theoretical and common sense considerations about out-of-domain
predictions. In section 3 we discuss inferences about discount rates and demonstrate the power of
joint estimation of risk and time preferences as motivated by theory. Section 4 expands the joint
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inference discussion to longitudinal issues such as temporal stability.
1. Policy Lotteries
The motivation for the field experiments on which this research program is centered came
from our earlier work with the Danish Ministry of Business and Industry between 1996 and 2000 to
develop computable general equilibrium (CGE) models of public policy. Those policies ranged from
general tax reforms to specific carbon tax reforms, from the effects of relaxing domestic retail
opening hours to the effects on Denmark of global trade reform, from intergenerational welfare
issues to the dynamics of human capital formation. One of the hallmarks of the CGE models we
were developing was an explicit recognition that many of the structural parameters of those models
were uncertain, and that policy recommendations that came from them amounted to a “policy
lottery” in which probabilities could be attached to a range of possible outcomes. Recognition that
the simulated effects of policy on households were uncertain, because the specific parameters of the
model were uncertain, meant that a proper welfare analysis needed to account for the risk attitudes
of those households. 
Related to this dimension of these simulated results, in many cases there were nontrivial
intertemporal tradeoffs: foregone welfare in the short-term in return for longer-term gains. Indeed,
this tradeoff is a common feature of dynamic CGE policy models (e.g., Harrison, Jensen, Pedersen
and Rutherford [2000]). Obviously the proper welfare evaluation needed to also account for the
subjective discount rates that those households employed. For example, one of the policy issues of
interest to the Danish government was why Danes appeared to “underinvest” in higher education.
We elicited discount rates, in part, to address that policy question directly (see Lau [2000]).
A policy lottery is a representation of the predicted effects of a policy in which the
uncertainty of the simulated impact is explicitly presented to the policy maker. Thus when the policy
2 For example, see Desvousges et al. [1999]. The limitation on information can derive from the
inherent difficulty of modeling behavioral or physical relationships, from the short time-frame over which the
model has to be developed and applied, or both.
3 Revenue neutrality is defined in terms of real government revenue, and does not imply welfare
neutrality.
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maker decides that one policy option is better than another, the uncertainty in the estimate of the
impact has been taken into account. Note that this is uncertainty in the estimate of the impact, and not
necessarily uncertainty in the impact itself. But we submit that in the limited information world of
practical policy-making such uncertainties are rife.2
We illustrate the concept of a policy lottery using the CGE model documented in Harrison,
Jensen, Lau and Rutherford [2002]. This static model of the Danish economy is calibrated to data
from 1992. The version we use has 27 production sectors, each employing intermediate inputs and
primary factors to produce output for domestic and overseas consumption. A government agent
raises taxes and pays subsidies in a revenue-neutral manner, and the focus of our policy simulation is
on the indirect taxes levied by the Danish government.3 A representative government household
consumes goods reflecting public expenditure patterns in 1992. The simulated policy effects are
different across several private household types. The model is calibrated to a wide array of empirical
and a priori estimates of elasticities of substitution using nested constant elasticity of substitution
specifications for production and utility functions. More elaborate versions of the model exist in
which inter-temporal and inter-generational behavior are modeled (e.g., Lau [2000]), but this static
version is ideal for our illustrative purposes.
The model represents several different private households, based on the breakdown
provided by Statistics Denmark from the national household expenditure survey. For our purposes,
these households are differentiated by family type into 7 households: singles younger than 45
without children, singles older than 45 without children, households younger than 45 without
4 For example, if the empirical distribution of the elasticity of substitution is specified to be normal
with mean 1.3 and standard deviation 0.4, 95% of the random draws will be within ±1.96 × 0.4 of the mean.
Thus one would rarely see this elasticity take on values greater than 3 or 4 in the course of these random
draws.
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children, households older than 45 without children, singles with children, households with children
and where the oldest child is 6 or under, and households with children and where the oldest child is
between 7 and 17. The model generates the welfare impact on each of these households measured in
terms of the equivalent variation in annual income for that household. That is, it calculates the
amount of income the household would deem to be equivalent to the policy change, which entails
changes in factor prices, commodity prices and expenditure patterns. Thus the policy impact is some
number of Danish kroner, which represents the welfare gain to the household in income terms.
This welfare gain can be viewed directly as the “prize” in a policy lottery. Since there is some
uncertainty about the many parameters used to calibrate realistic simulation models of this kind,
there is some uncertainty about the calculation of the welfare impact. If we perturb one or more of
the elasticities, for example, the welfare gain might well be above or below the baseline computation.
Using randomized factorial designs for such sensitivity analyses, we can undertake a large number of
these perturbations and assign a probability weight to each one (Harrison and Vinod [1992]). Each
simulation involves a random draw for each elasticity, but where the value drawn reflects estimates
of the empirical distribution of the elasticity.4 We undertake 1,000 simulations with randomly
generated elasticity perturbations, so it is as if the household faces a policy lottery consisting of 1,000
distinct prizes that occur with equal probability 0.001. The prizes, again, are the welfare gains that
the model solves for in each such simulation.
Figure 1 illustrates the type of policy lottery that can arise. In this case we consider a policy
of making all indirect taxes in Denmark uniform, and at a uniform value that just maintains the real
value of government expenditure. Thus we solve for a revenue-neutral reform in which the indirect
5 Defined by the 25th and 75th percentiles, this range represents 50% of the observations around the
median.
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tax distortions arising from inter-sectoral variation in those taxes are reduced to zero. Each box in
Figure 1 represents 1,000 welfare evaluations of the model for each household type. The large dot is
the median welfare impact, the rectangle is the interquartile range,5 and the whiskers represent the
range of observed values. Thus we see that the policy represents a lottery for each household, with
some uncertainty about the impacts.
Generation of policy lotteries are not restricted to CGE models. The method applies to any
simulation model that generates outcomes that reflect policy changes. For example, Fiore, Harrison,
Hughes and Rutström [2009] used a simulation model of the spread of forest fire, developed by the
USDA for that purpose and calibrated to detailed GIS data for a specific area, to generate policy
lotteries for experimental subjects to make choices over. Our approach just recognizes that policy
models of this kind are never certain, and that they contain standard errors: in fact lots of standard
errors. But that uncertainty should not be ignored when the policy maker uses the model to decide
on good policies.
The idea that policies are lotteries is a simple one, and well known in the older simulation
literature in CGE modeling. The methods developed to address it amounted to Monte Carlo
analyses on repeated simulations in which each uncertain parameter was perturbed around its point
estimate. By constraining these perturbations to within some empirical or a priori confidence region,
one implicitly constrained the simulated policy outcome to that region. The same idea plays a central
role in the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (Stern [2007]). It stresses (p.163) the need to
have a simulation model of the economic effects of climate change that can show stochastic impacts.
In fact, any of the standard climate simulation models can easily be set up to do that, by simply
undertaking a systematic sensitivity analysis of their results. The Review then proposes an “expected
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utility analysis” of the costs of climate change (p. 173ff.) which is effectively the same as viewing
climate change impacts as a lottery. When one then considers alternative policies to mitigate the risk
of climate change, the “expected utility analysis” is the same as our policy lottery concept.
If a policy-maker were to evaluate the expected utility to each household from this policy, he
would have to take into account the uncertainty of the estimated outcome and the risk attitudes of
the household. The traditional approach in policy analysis is to implicitly assume that households are
all risk-neutral and simply report the average welfare impact. But we know from our experimental
results that these households are not risk neutral. Assume a Constant Relative Risk Aversion
(CRRA) utility specification for each household. Anticipating the later discussion of our
experimental results, we can stratify our raw elicited CRRA intervals according to these 7 households
and obtain CRRA estimates of 1.17, 0.48, 0.79, 0.69, 0.76, 0.81 and 0.95, respectively, for each of
these households. In each case these are statistically significantly different from risk neutrality.
Using these CRRA risk attitude estimates, it is a simple matter to evaluate the utility of the
welfare gain in each simulation, to then calculate the expected utility of the proposed policy, and to
finally calculate the certainty-equivalent welfare gain. Doing so reduces the welfare gain relative to
the risk-neutral case, of course, since there is some uncertainty about the impacts. For this
illustrative policy, this model, these empirical distributions of elasticities, and these estimates of risk
attitudes, we find that the neglect of risk aversion results in an overstatement of the welfare gains by
1.6%, 1.4%, 1.8%, 1.1%, 5.1%, 4.6% and 7.9%, respectively, for each of the households. Thus a
policy maker would overstate the welfare gains from the policy if risk attitudes were ignored.
Tax uniformity is a useful pedagogic example, and a staple in public economics, but one that
generates relatively precise estimates of welfare gains in most simulation models of this kind. It is
easy to consider alternative realistic policy simulations that would generate much more variation in
welfare gain, and hence larger corrections from using the household’s risk attitude in policy
6 The manner in which these sidepayments are computed is explained in Harrison, Jensen, Lau and
Rutherford [2002]. It corresponds to a stylized version of the type of political balancing act one often
encounters behind the scenes in the design of a public policy such as this.
7  For example, if the elasticity of demand for a product with a large initial indirect tax is higher than
the default elasticity, households can substitute towards that product more readily and enjoy a higher real
income for any given factor income.
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evaluation. For example, assume instead that indirect taxes in this model were reduced across the
board by 25%, and that the government affected lump-sum side payments to each household to
ensure that no household had less than a 1% welfare gain.6 In this case, plausible elasticity
configurations for the model exist that result in very large welfare gains for some households.7
Ignoring the risk attitudes of the households would result in welfare gains being overstated by much
more significant amounts, ranging from 18.9% to 42.7% depending on the household.
These policy applications point to the payoff from estimating risk attitudes, as we do here,
but they are only illustrative. A number of limiting assumptions obviously have to be imposed on
our estimates for them to apply to the policy exercise. First, we have to assume that the estimates of
CRRA obtained from our experimental tasks defined over the domain of prizes up to 4,500 DKK
apply more widely, to the domain of welfare gains shown in Figure 1. Given the evidence from our
estimation of the Expo-Power function, reported in Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2006], we are
prepared to make that assumption for now. Obviously one would want to elicit risk attitudes over
wider prize domains to be confident of this assumption, however. Second, we only aggregate
households into 7 different types, each of which is likely to contain households with widely varying
characteristics on other dimensions than family types. Despite these limitations, these illustrations
point out the importance of attending to the risk preference assumptions imposed in policy
evaluations. Recent efforts in modelling multiple households in computable general equilibrium have
been driven by concerns about the impacts of trade reform on poverty in developing countries, since
one can only examine those by identifying the poorest households: see Harrison, Rutherford and
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Tarr [2003] and Harrison, Rutherford, Tarr and Gurgel [2004]. Clearly one would expect risk
aversion to be a particularly important factor for households close to or below the absolute poverty
line.
It might be apparent that we would have to conduct field experiments with a sample
representative of the Danish population in order to calibrate a CGE model of the Danish economy
to risk attitudes that were to be regarded as having any credibility with policy-makers. But perhaps
this is not so obvious to academics, who are often happy to generalize from convenience samples. In
a related setting, in this instance with respect to behavioral findings from laboratory experiments
that question some of the theoretical foundations of welfare economics, List [2005; p.36] records
that in his
... discussions with agency officials in the U.S. who perform/oversee benefit-cost
analyses, many are aware of these empirical findings, and realize that they have been
robust across unfamiliar goods, such as irradiated sandwiches, and common goods,
such as chocolate bars, but many remain skeptical of the received results. Most
importantly for our purposes, some policymakers view experimental laboratory
results with a degree of suspicion, one noting that the methods are akin to “scientific
numerology.” When pressed on this issue, some suggest that their previous
experience with stated preference surveys leads them to discount experimental
results, especially those with student samples, and they conclude that the empirical
findings do not merit policy changes yet. A few policy officials openly wondered if
the anomalous findings would occur in experiments with “real” people.
Our experience has been the same, and is why we were led to conduct field experiments in
Denmark.
2. Risk Aversion
In order to evaluate the policy lottery considered in the previous section, we needed to have
estimates of the risk attitudes for the different households in Denmark. We therefore designed an
experiment to elicit risk attitudes (and discount rates) from representative Danes. The experiment is
a longitudinal panel where we revisited many of the first stage participants at a later date. In this
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section we discuss the issues that arose in our field experiments, with an emphasis on those issues
that are relatively novel as a result of the field context.
The immediate implication, of course, was that we needed to generate a sampling frame that
allowed us to make inferences about the broader adult population in Denmark. This led us to
employ stratified sampling methods for large-scale surveys, which are relatively familiar to labor
economists and health economists, but which had not been used in the experimental literature. We
were also concerned about possible sample selection effects from our recruiting strategy, and the
possibility of what is known in the literature as “randomization bias.” Two types of sample selection
effects were possible. First, we were concerned that the information about earnings in the
recruitment information would attract a sample biased in the direction of risk loving. Second, we
were concerned that particular experiences in the first stage of the experiment could bias attrition to
the second stage. These concerns influenced not only our econometric strategy but also lead to the
design of complementary lab experiments to directly test for such effects.
The next concern was with the design of the elicitation procedure itself. There were many
alternatives available in the literature, and known trade-offs from using one or the other. We were
particularly concerned to have an elicitation procedure that could be relatively easily implemented in
the field, even though we had the benefit compared to some field contexts of being able to assume a
literate population. We use elicitation procedures that do not have a specific context since the
purpose was to generate risk preference parameters for general policy use. We use complementary
lab experiments to condition our field inferences on any vulnerability in responses to variations in
procedures. These procedural variations were guided by hypotheses about the effect of frames on
the participants’ perception of the task and on their use of information processing heuristics.
Once we had collected the experimental data, several issues arose concerning the manner in
which one infer the risk attitudes. These issues demanded the use of an explicit, structural approach
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to estimating models of choice over risky lotteries. The reason is that we wanted to obtain estimates
of the latent parameters of these choice models, and to be able to evaluate alternative choice models
at a structural level. One attraction of this approach is that it allowed us to be explicit about issues
that are often left implicit, but which can have a dramatic affect on inferred risk attitudes; one
example is the specification of what is known as a “behavioral error term” in these choice models.
Another attraction is that it allowed us to examine alternative theories to expected utility theory
using a comparable inferential framework. 
Our goal was to generate measures of risk attitudes for a range of monetary prizes and over
time. With this data we can investigate the robustness of the measures over time, as reflective of
stationary or state dependent preferences, and robustness with respect to income changes.
A. Sampling Procedures
The sample for the field experiments was designed to be representative of the adult Danish
population in 2003. There were six steps in the construction of the sample, detailed in Harrison,
Lau, Rutström and Sullivan [2005] and essentially following those employed in Harrison, Lau and
Williams [2002]:
• First, a random sample of 25,000 Danes was drawn from the Danish Civil Registration
Office in January 2003. Only Danes born between 1927 and 1983 were included, thereby
restricting the age range of the target population to between 19 and 75. For each person in
this random sample we had access to their name, address, county, municipality, birth date,
and sex. Due to the absence of names and/or addresses, 28 of these records were discarded.
• Second, we discarded 17 municipalities (including one county) from the population, due to
them being located in extraordinarily remote locations, and hence being very costly to
recruit. The population represented in these locations amounts to less than 2% of the
8 We control for county and the recruitment wave to which the subject responded in our statistical
analysis of sample selection. Response rates were higher in the greater Copenhagen area compared to the rest
of the country. The experiments were conducted under the auspices of the Ministry of Economic and
Business Affairs, and people living outside of the greater Copenhagen area may be suspicious of government
employees and therefore less likely to respond to our letter of invitation.
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Danish population, or 493 individuals in our sample of 25,000 from the Civil Registry.
Hence it is unlikely that this exclusion could quantitatively influence our results on sample
selection bias.
• Third, we assigned each county either 1 session or 2 sessions, in rough proportionality to the
population of the county. In total we assigned 20 sessions. Each session consisted of two
sub-sessions at the same locale and date, one at 5pm and another at 8pm, and subjects were
allowed to choose which sub-session suited them best.
• Fourth, we divided 6 counties into two sub-groups because the distance between some
municipalities in the county and the location of the session would be too large. A weighted
random draw was made between the two sub-groups and the location selected, where the
weights reflect the relative size of the population in September 2002. 
• Fifth, we picked the first 30 or 60 randomly sorted records within each county, depending
on the number of sessions allocated to that county. This provided a sub-sample of 600.
• Sixth, we mailed invitations to attend a session to the sub-sample of 600, offering each
person a choice of times for the session. Response rates were low in some counties, so
another 64 invitations were mailed out in these counties to newly drawn subjects.8 Everyone
that gave a positive response was assigned to a session, and our recruited sample was 268.
Attendance at the experimental sessions was extraordinarily high, including 4 persons who
did not respond to the letter of invitation but showed up unexpectedly and participated in the
experiment. Four persons turned up for their session, but were not able to participate in the
9 The first person suffered from dementia and could not remember the instructions; the second
person was a 76 year old woman who was not able to control the mouse and eventually gave up; the third
person had just won a world championship in sailing and was too busy with media interviews to stay for two
hours; and the fourth person was sent home because they arrived after the instructions had begun and we had
already included one unexpected “walk-in” to fill their position. 
10 Certain events might have plausibly triggered some of the no-shows: for example, 3 men did not
turn up on June 11, 2003, but that was the night that the Danish national soccer team played a qualifying
game for the European championships against Luxembourg that was not scheduled when we picked session
dates.
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experiments.9 These experiments were conducted in June of 2003, and a total of 253 subjects
participated.10 Sample weights for the subjects in the experiment can be constructed using this
experimental design, and can be used to calculate weighted distributions and averages that better
reflect the adult population of Denmark.
B. Elicitation Procedures
There are many general elicitation procedures that have been used in the literature to
ascertain risk attitudes from individuals in the experimental laboratory using non-interactive settings,
and each is reviewed in detail by Harrison and Rutström [2008]. Most of these simply present
participants with lotteries specified using various monetary prizes and probabilities without attaching
a particular context: these are labeled “artefactual” presentations. An approach made popular by
Holt and Laury [2002] is the Multiple Price List (MPL), which entails giving the subject an ordered
array of binary lottery choices to make all at once. The MPL requires the subject to pick one of the
lotteries on offer, and then plays that lottery out for the subject to be rewarded. The earliest use of
the MPL design in the context of elicitation of risk attitudes is, we believe, Miller, Meyer and
Lanzetta [1969]. Their design confronted each subject with 5 alternatives that constitute an MPL,
although the alternatives were presented individually over 100 trials. The method was later used by
Schubert, Brown, Gysler and Brachinger [1999], Barr and Packard [2002] and, of course, Holt and
11 We are implicitly assuming that the utility function of the subject is only defined over the prizes of
the experimental task. We discuss this assumption below.
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Laury [2002]. The MPL has the advantage of allowing the subject to easily compare options
involving various risks. As is the case with all procedures of this nature there is some question about
the robustness of responses with respect to procedural variations. We decided to use complementary
lab experiments to explore several of these procedural issues, rather than incur the expense of
evaluating them in the field.
In our field version of the MPL each subject is presented with a choice between two
lotteries, which we can call A or B. Table 1 illustrates the basic payoff matrix presented to subjects in
our experiments. The complete procedures are described in Harrison, Lau, Rutström and Sullivan
[2005]. The first row shows that lottery A offered a 10% chance of receiving 2,000 DKK and a 90%
chance of receiving 1,600 DKK. The expected value of this lottery, EVA, is shown in the third-last
column as 1,640 DKK, although the EV columns were not presented to subjects. Similarly, lottery B
in the first row has chances of payoffs of 3,850 and 100 DKK, for an expected value of 475 DKK.
Thus the two lotteries have a relatively large difference in expected values, in this case 1,165 DKK.
As one proceeds down the matrix, the expected value of both lotteries increases, but the expected
value of lottery B becomes greater relative to the expected value of lottery A.
In a traditional MPL the subject chooses A or B in each row, and one row is later selected at
random for payout for that subject. The logic behind this test for risk aversion is that only risk-
loving subjects would take lottery B in the first row, and only very risk-averse subjects would take
lottery A in the second last row.11 Arguably, the last row is simply a test that the subject understood
the instructions, and has no relevance for risk aversion at all. A risk neutral subject should switch
from choosing A to B when the EV of each is about the same, so a risk-neutral subject would
choose A for the first four rows and B thereafter. In our field implementation we instead had the
12 That is, if someone decides at some stage to switch from option A to option B between probability
0.4 and 0.5, the next stage of an iMPL would then prompt the subject to make more choices within this
interval for probabilities form 0.40 to 0.50 increasing by 0.01 on each row. The computer implementation of
the iMPL restricts the number of stages to ensure that the intervals exceed some a priori cognitive threshold
(e.g., probability increments of 0.01).
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subject choose on which row to switch from A to B, thus forcing monotonicity, but we also added
an option to indicate indifference: we refer to this variant of the MPL as a Sequential MPL (sMPL).
For those subjects who did not express indifference we recognized the opportunity to get more
refined measures by following up with a subsequent stage where the probabilities attached to the
prizes lay within the range of those on the previous switching interval: we refer to this variant as the
Iterative MPL (iMPL).12
The iMPL uses the same incentive logic as the MPL and sMPL. The logic of selecting a row
for payment is maintained but necessitated a revision of the random method used. Let the first stage
of the iMPL be called Level 1, the second stage Level 2, and so on. After making all responses, the
subject has one row from the first table of responses in Level 1 selected at random by the
experimenter. In the MPL that is all there is since there is only a Level 1 table. In the iMPL, that is
all there is if the row selected at random by the experimenter is not the one at which the subject
switched in Level 1. If it is the row at which the subject switched, another random draw is made to
pick a row in the Level 2 table. For some tasks this procedure is repeated to Level 3.
In order to investigate what effect there may be on responses from using the iMPL we ran
lab experiments comparing this procedure to the standard MPL and the sMPL (see Andersen,
Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2006]). As noted above, the sMPL changes the MPL to ask the subject
to pick the switch point from one lottery to the other, but without the refinement of probabilities
allowed in iMPL. Thus it enforces monotonicity, but still allows subjects to express indifference at
the “switch” point, akin to a “fat switch point.” The subject was then paid in the same manner as
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with MPL, but with the non-switch choices filled in automatically. 
We used four separate risk aversion tasks with each subject, each with different prizes
designed so that all 16 prizes span the range of income over which we seek to estimate risk aversion.
The four sets of prizes were as follows, with the two prizes for lottery A listed first and the two
prizes for lottery B listed next: (A1: 2000 DKK, 1600 DKK; B1: 3850 DKK, 100 DKK), (A2: 2250
DKK, 1500 DKK; B2: 4000 DKK, 500 DKK), (A3: 2000 DKK, 1750 DKK; B3: 4000 DKK, 150
DKK), and (A4: 2500 DKK, 1000 DKK; B4: 4500 DKK, 50 DKK). At the time of the
experiments, the exchange rate was approximately 6.55 DKK per U.S. dollar, so these prizes ranged
from approximately $7.65 to $687.
We ask the subject to respond to all four risk aversion tasks and then randomly decide which
task and row to play out. In addition, the large incentives and budget constraints precluded paying all
subjects, so each subject is given a 10 percent chance to actually receive the payment associated with
his decision.
We take each of the binary choices of the subject as the data, and estimate the parameters of
a latent utility function that explains those choices using an appropriate error structure to account
for the panel nature of the data. Once the utility function is defined, for a candidate value of the
parameters of that function, we can construct the expected utility of the two gambles, and then use a
linking function to infer the likelihood of the observed choice. We discuss statistical specifications in
more detail below.
The MPL instrument has an apparent weakness because it might suggest a frame that
encourages subjects to select the middle row, contrary to their unframed risk preferences. The
antidote for this potential problem is to devise various “skewed” frames in which the middle row
implies different risk attitudes, and see if there are differences across frames. Simple procedures to
detect such framing effects, and correct for them statistically if present, have been developed, and
13 In our experience subjects are suspicious of randomization generated by computers. Given the
propensity of many experimenters in other disciplines to engage in deception, we avoid computer
randomization whenever feasible.
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are discussed below (e.g., Harrison, Lau, Rutström and Sullivan [2005], Andersen, Harrison, Lau and
Rutström [2006] and Harrison, List and Towe [2007]). 
In summary, the set of MPL instruments provides a relatively transparent procedure to elicit
risk attitudes. Subjects rarely get confused about the incentives to respond truthfully, particularly
when the randomizing devices are physical die that they know that they will toss themselves.13 As we
demonstrate later, it is also possible to infer a risk attitude interval for the specific subject, at least
under some reasonable assumptions, as well as to use the choice data to estimate structural
parameters of choice models.
C. Estimation Procedures
Two broad methods of estimating risk attitudes have been used. One involves the
calculation of bounds implied by observed choices, typically using utility functions which only have a
single parameter to be inferred. A major limitation of this approach is that it restricts the analyst to
utility functions that can characterize risk attitudes using one parameter. This is because one must
infer the bounds that make the subject indifferent between the switch points, and such inferences
become virtually incoherent statistically when there are two or more parameters. Of course, for
popular functions such as CRRA or Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) this is not an issue,
but if one wants to move beyond those functions then there are problems. It is possible to devise
one-parameter functional forms with more flexibility than CRRA or CARA in some dimension, as
illustrated nicely by the one-parameter Expo-Power function developed by Abdellaoui, Barrios and
Wakker [2007; §4]. But in general we need to move to structural modeling with maximum likelihood
14 In an important respect joint estimation can be viewed as Full Information Maximum Likelihood
(FIML) since it uses the entire set of structural equations from theory to define the overall likelihood.
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to accommodate richer models.
The other broad approach involves the direct estimation by maximum likelihood of some
structural model of a latent choice process in which the core parameters defining risk attitudes can
be estimated, in the manner pioneered by Camerer and Ho [1994; §6.1] and Hey and Orme [1994].
This structural approach is particularly attractive for non-EUT specifications, where several core
parameters combine to characterize risk attitudes. For example, one cannot characterize risk
attitudes under Prospect Theory without making some statement about loss aversion and probability
weighting, along with the curvature of the utility function. Thus joint estimation of all parameters is
a necessity for reliable statements about risk attitudes in such cases.14
Assume for the moment that utility of income is defined by
U(x) = x(1!r)/(1!r) (1)
where x is the lottery prize and r…1 is a parameter to be estimated. For r=1 assume U(x)=ln(x) if
needed. We come back later to the controversial issue of what “x” might be, but for now we assume
that it is just the prize shown in the lottery. Thus r is the coefficient of CRRA: r=0 corresponds to
risk neutrality, r<0 to risk loving, and r>0 to risk aversion. Let there be two possible outcomes in a
lottery. Under EUT the probabilities for each outcome Mj, p(Mj), are those that are induced by the
experimenter, so expected utility is simply the probability weighted utility of each outcome in each
lottery i plus some level of background consumption T:
EUi = 3j=1,2 [ p(Mj) × U(T+Mj) ]. (2)
The EU for each lottery pair is calculated for a candidate estimate of r, and the index
LEU = EUR ! EUL (3)
calculated, where EUL is the “left” lottery and EUR is the “right” lottery as presented to subjects.
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This latent index, based on latent preferences, is then linked to observed choices using a standard
cumulative normal distribution function M(LEU). This “probit” function takes any argument
between ±4 and transforms it into a number between 0 and 1 using the function shown in Figure 2.
Thus we have the probit link function,
prob(choose lottery R) = M(LEU) (4)
The logistic function is very similar, as illustrated in Figure 2, and leads instead to the “logit”
specification.
Even though Figure 2 is common in econometrics texts, it is worth noting explicitly and
understanding. It forms the critical statistical link between observed binary choices, the latent
structure generating the index y* = LEU, and the probability of that index y* being observed. In our
applications y* refers to some function, such as (3), of the EU of two lotteries; or, if one is
estimating a Prospect Theory model, the prospective utility of two lotteries. The index defined by (3)
is linked to the observed choices by specifying that the R lottery is chosen when M(LEU)>½, which
is implied by (4).
Thus the likelihood of the observed responses, conditional on the EUT and CRRA
specifications being true, depends on the estimates of r given the above statistical specification and
the observed choices. The “statistical specification” here includes assuming some functional form
for the cumulative density function (CDF), such as one of the two shown in Figure 2. If we ignore
responses that reflect indifference for the moment the conditional log-likelihood would be
ln L(r; y, T, X) = 3i [ (ln M(LEU)×I(yi = 1)) + (ln (1-M(LEU))×I(yi = !1)) ] (5)
where I(@) is the indicator function, yi =1(!1) denotes the choice of the Option B (A) lottery in risk
aversion task i, and X is a vector of individual characteristics reflecting age, sex, race, and so on. The
parameter r is defined as a linear function of the characteristics in vector X.
In most experiments the subjects are told at the outset that any expression of indifference
15 Our treatment of indifferent responses uses the specification developed by Papke and Wooldridge
[1996; equation 5, p.621] for fractional dependant variables. Alternatively, one could follow Hey and Orme
[1994; p.1302] and introduce a new parameter J to capture the idea that certain subjects state indifference
when the latent index showing how much they prefer one lottery over another falls below some threshold J in
absolute value. This is a natural assumption to make, particularly for the experiments they ran in which the
subjects were told that expressions of indifference would be resolved by the experimenter, but not told how
the experimenter would do that (p.1295, footnote 4). It adds one more parameter to estimate, but for good
cause.
16 Clustering commonly arises in national field surveys from the fact that physically proximate
households are often sampled to save time and money, but it can also arise from more homely sampling
procedures. For example, Williams [2000; p.645] notes that it could arise from dental studies that “collect data
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would mean that if that choice was selected to be played out a fair coin would be tossed to make the
decision for them. Hence one can modify the likelihood to take these responses into account by
recognizing that such choices implied a 50:50 mixture of the likelihood of choosing either lottery:
ln L(r; y, T, X) = 3i [ (ln M(LEU)×I(yi = 1)) + (ln (1-M(LEU))×I(yi = !1)) +
((½ ln M(LEU) + ½ ln (1-M(LEU))×I(yi = 0)) ] (5')
where yi =0 denotes the choice of indifference. In our experience very few subjects choose the
indifference option, but this formal statistical extension accommodates those responses.15
The latent index (3) could have been written in a ratio form:
LEU = EUR / (EUR + EUL) (3')
and then the latent index would already be in the form of a probability between 0 and 1, so we
would not need to take the probit or logit transformation. This specification has also been used, with
some modifications we discuss later, in Holt and Laury [2002].
Harrison and Rutström [2008; Appendix F] review procedures and syntax from the popular
statistical package Stata that can be used to estimate structural models of this kind, as well as more
complex non-EUT models. The goal is to illustrate how experimental economists can write explicit
maximum likelihood (ML) routines that are specific to different structural choice models. It is a
simple matter to correct for stratified survey responses, multiple responses from the same subject
(“clustering”),16 or heteroskedasticity, as needed.
on each tooth surface for each of several teeth from a set of patients” or “repeated measurements or recurrent
events observed on the same person.” The procedures for allowing for clustering allow heteroskedasticity
between and within clusters, as well as autocorrelation within clusters. They are closely related to the
“generalized estimating equations” approach to panel estimation in epidemiology (see Liang and Zeger
[1986]), and generalize the “robust standard errors” approach popular in econometrics (see Rogers [1993]).
Wooldridge [2003] reviews some issues in the use of clustering for panel effects, noting that significant
inferential problems may arise with small numbers of panels. 
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Using the CRRA utility function and equations (1) through (4), we estimate r to be 0.78 for
the Danish population, with a standard error of 0.052 and a 95% confidence interval between 0.68
and 0.88. This reflects modest risk aversion over these stakes, and is significantly different from risk-
neutrality (r=0).
Extensions of the basic model are easy to implement, and this is the major attraction of the
structural estimation approach. For example, one can easily extend the functional forms of utility to
allow for varying degrees of relative risk aversion (RRA). Consider, as one important example, the
Expo-Power (EP) utility function proposed by Saha [1993]. Following Holt and Laury [2002], the
EP function is defined as
U(x) = [1!exp(!"x1!r)]/", (1')
where " and r are parameters to be estimated. RRA is then r + "(1!r)y1!r, so RRA varies with
income if "…0. This function nests CRRA (as "60) and CARA (as r60). We illustrate the use of this
EP specification in Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2007].
It is also simple matter to generalize this ML analysis to allow the core parameter r to be a
linear function of observable characteristics of the individual or task. We would then extend the
model to be r = r0 + R×X, where r0 is a fixed parameter and R is a vector of effects associated with
each characteristic in the variable vector X. In effect the unconditional model assumes r = r0 and just
estimates r0. This extension significantly enhances the attraction of structural ML estimation,
particularly for responses pooled over different subjects, since one can condition estimates on
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observable characteristics of the task or subject.
An important extension of the core model is to allow for subjects to make some errors. The
notion of error is one that has already been encountered in the form of the statistical assumption
that the probability of choosing a lottery is not 1 when the EU of that lottery exceeds the EU of the
other lottery. This assumption is clear in the use of a link function between the latent index LEU
and the probability of picking one or other lottery; in the case of the normal CDF, this link function
is M(LEU) and is displayed in Figure 2. If there were no errors from the perspective of EUT, this
function would be a step function, which is shown in Figure 3: zero for all values of y*<0, anywhere
between 0 and 1 for y*=0, and 1 for all values of y*>0. 
The problem with the CDF of the Hardnose Theorist is immediate: it predicts with
probability one or zero. The likelihood approach asks the model to state the probability of observing
the actual choice, conditional on some trial values of the parameters of the theory. Maximum
likelihood then locates those parameters that generate the highest probability of observing the data.
For binary choice tasks, and independent observations, we know that the likelihood of the sample is
just the product of the likelihood of each choice conditional on the model and the parameters
assumed, and that the likelihood of each choice is just the probability of that choice. So if we have
any choice that has zero probability, and it might be literally 1-in-a-million choices, the likelihood for
that observation is not defined. Even if we set the probability of the choice to some arbitrarily small,
positive value, the log-likelihood zooms off to minus infinity. We can reject the theory without even
firing up any statistical package.
Of course, this implication is true for any theory that predicts deterministically, including
Expected Utility Theory. This is why one needs some formal statement about how the deterministic
prediction of the theory translates into a probability of observing one choice or the other, and then
17 Exactly the same insight in a strategic context leads one from Nash Equilibria to Quantal Response
Equilibria, if one re-interprets Figures 2 and 3, respectively, in terms of best-response functions defined over
expected (utility) payoffs from two strategies. The only difference in the maximum likelihood specification is
that the equilibrium condition jointly constrains the likelihood of observing certain choices by two or more
players.
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perhaps also some formal statement about the role that structural errors might play.17 In short, one
cannot divorce the job of the theorist from the job of the econometrician, and some assumption about the process
linking latent preferences and observed choices is needed. That assumption might be about the
mathematical form of the link, as in (1), but it cannot be avoided. Even the very definition of risk
aversion needs to be specified using stochastic terms unless we are to impose absurd economic
properties on estimates (Wilcox [2008][2010]).
By varying the shape of the link function in Figure 2, one can informally imagine subjects
that are more sensitive to a given difference in the index LEU and subjects that are not so sensitive.
Of course, such informal intuition is not strictly valid, since we can choose any scaling of utility for a
given subject, but it is suggestive of the motivation for allowing for structural errors, and why we
might want them to vary across subjects or task domains.
Consider the structural error specification used by Holt and Laury [2002], originally due to
Luce. The EU for each lottery pair is calculated for candidate estimates of r, as explained above, and
the ratio
LEU = EUR1/: / (EUL1/: + EUR1/:) (3O)
calculated, where : is a structural “noise parameter” used to allow some errors from the perspective
of the deterministic EUT model. The index LEU is in the form of a cumulative probability
distribution function defined over differences in the EU of the two lotteries and the noise parameter
:. Thus, as :60 this specification collapses to the deterministic choice EUT model, where the
choice is strictly determined by the EU of the two lotteries; but as : gets larger and larger the choice
18 Some specifications place the error at the final choice between one lottery or after the subject has
decided which one has the higher expected utility; some place the error earlier, on the comparison of
preferences leading to the choice; and some place the error even earlier, on the determination of the expected
utility of each lottery.
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essentially becomes random. When :=1 this specification collapses to (3'), where the probability of
picking one lottery is given by the ratio of the EU of one lottery to the sum of the EU of both
lotteries. Thus : can be viewed as a parameter that flattens out the link functions in Figure 2 as it
gets larger. This is just one of several different types of error story that could be used, and Wilcox
[2008] provides a masterful review of the implications of the alternatives.18
There is one other important error specification, due originally to Fechner and popularized
by Hey and Orme [1994]. This error specification posits the latent index
LEU = (EUR ! EUL)/: (3“)
instead of (3), (3') or (3O).
Wilcox [2008] notes that as an analytical matter the evidence of IRRA in Holt and Laury
[2002] would be weaker, or perhaps even absent, if one had used a Fechner error specification
instead of a Luce error specification. This important claim, that the evidence for IRRA may be an
artefact of the (more or less arbitrary) stochastic identifying restriction assumed, can be tested with
the original data from Holt and Laury [2002] and is correct: see Harrison and Rutström [2008;
Figure 9].
An important contribution to the characterization of behavioral errors is the “contextual
error” specification proposed by Wilcox [2010]. It is designed to allow robust inferences about the
primitive “more stochastically risk averse than,” and avoids the type of “residual-tail-wagging-the-
dog” results that one gets when using the Fechner or Luce specification and the Holt and Laury
[2002] data. It posits the latent index
LEU = ((EUR ! EUL)<)/: (3*)
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instead of (3“), or
LEU = (EUR/<) 1/: / ((EUL/<)1/: + (EUR/<)1/:) (3**)
instead of (3O), where < is a new, normalizing term for each lottery pair L and R. The normalizing
term < is defined as the maximum utility over all prizes in this lottery pair minus the minimum utility
over all prizes in this lottery pair. The value of < varies, in principle, from lottery choice to lottery
choice: hence it is said to be “contextual.” For the Fechner specification, dividing by < ensures that
the normalized EU difference [(EUR ! EUL)/<] remains in the unit interval.
D. Asset Integration
There is a tension between experimental economists and theorists over the proper
interpretation of estimates of risk attitudes that emerge from experimental choice behavior.
Experimental economists claim to provide evidence of risk aversion over small stakes, which we
take here to be amounts such as $10, $100 or even several hundred dollars. Some theorists argue
that these estimates are “implausible,” in a sense to be made explicit. Although the original
arguments of theorists were couched as attacks on the plausibility of EUT (e.g., Hansson [1988] and
Rabin [2002]), it is now apparent that the issues are just as important, or unimportant, for non-EUT
models (e.g., Safra and Segal [2008] and Cox and Sadiraj [2008]).
The notion of plausibility can be understood best by thinking of the argument in several
steps, even if they are often collapsed into one. First, someone proposes point estimates of some
utility function. These estimates typically come from inferences based on observed choice behavior
in an experiment, derived from maximum likelihood estimates of a structural model of latent choice
behavior (e.g., Harrison and Rutström [2008; §3]). Standard errors on those estimates are usually not
relied on in these exercises. Second, with some auxiliary assumptions, an analyst constructs a lottery
choice task in which these point estimates generate predictions on some domain of lottery prizes,
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typically involving at least one prize that is much larger than the domain of prizes over which the
estimates were derived (e.g., Rabin [2002], Cox and Sadiraj [2008; §3.2]). In some cases these
predictions are also defined on the domain of lottery prizes of the experimental tasks (e.g., Cox and
Sadiraj [2008; §4.5]). Third, the analyst views this constructed lottery choice task as a “thought
experiment,” in the sense that it is just like an actual experiment except that it is not actually
implemented (Harrison and List [2004; §9]). One reason not to conduct the experiment is that it
might involve astronomic stakes, but the main reason is that it is assumed a priori obvious what the
choice would be, in some sense eliminating the need for additional experiments. Finally, it is pointed
out that the predicted outcome from the initial estimates is contrary to the a priori obvious choice in
the thought experiment. Thumbs down, and the initial estimates are discarded as implausible.
Since the initial estimates are typically defined over observed experimental choices with small
stakes, we refer here to the implied claims about risk aversion as “risk aversion in the small.” The
predicted behavior in the thought experiment is typically defined over choices with very large stakes,
so we refer to the implied choices as reflecting “risk aversion in the large.” So plausibility can be
viewed as a tension and inconsistency between observations (real and imagined a priori) generated on
two domains. The issue is not that the subject has to have the same relative or absolute measure of
risk aversion for different prizes: these problems arise even when “flexible” functional forms are
employed for utility functions.
One general response is to just focus on risk attitudes in the small, and make no claims about
behavior beyond the domain over which the estimates were obtained. This position states that if one
had estimated over larger domains, then the estimated models would reflect actual choices over that
domain, but one simply cannot apply the risk aversion estimates outside the domain of estimation.
Since large parts of economic theory are written in terms of the utility of income, rather than the
utility of wealth, this approach has some validity.  Of course, there is nothing in principle to stop
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one defining income as a large number, either with a large budget, subjects in a very poor country
(e.g., Harrison, Humphrey and Verschoor [2010]), or by using natural experiments such as game
shows (e.g., Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2007b]).
A second approach, which we employed in Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008a],
was to assume some level of baseline consumption that was suggested by expenditure data for the
subjects.
A third approach is to test for the degree of asset integration in observed behavior. If one
adopts a general specification, following Cox and Sadiraj [2006], and allows income and wealth to be
arguments of some utility function, then one does not have to assume that the argument of the
utility function is income or wealth. One might posit an aggregation function that combines the two
in some way, and this composite then being evaluated with some standard utility function. For
example, assume the linear aggregation function TW + y, where W is wealth, y is experimental
income, and T is some weighting parameter to be assumed or estimated. Or one could treat TW and
y as inputs into some Constant Elasticity of Substitution function, and estimate or assume T and the
elasticity of substitution. This approach allows the popular special cases of zero asset integration and
perfect asset integration, but lets the “data decide” when these parameters are estimated in the
presence of actual choices. Where does one get estimates of W? As it happens, very good proxies for
W can be inferred from data in Denmark that is collected by Statistics Denmark, the official
government statistics agency. One can then calculate those proxies for subjects that have been in
experiments such as ours (such things being feasible in Denmark, with appropriate confidentiality
agreements), and estimate the weighting parameter. Preliminary estimates suggest that T is very
small indeed, and that the elasticity of substitution between TW and y is close to 1.
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3. Discount Rates
In many settings in experimental economics we want to elicit some preference from a set of
choices that also depend on risk attitudes. Often these involve strategic games, where the uncertain
ways in which behavior of others deviate from standard predictions engenders a lottery for each
player. Such uncertain deviations could be due to, for example, unobservable social preferences such
as fairness or reciprocity. One example is the offer observed in Ultimatum bargaining when the
other player cannot be assumed to always accept a minuscule amount of money, and acceptable
thresholds may be uncertain. Other examples include Public goods contribution games where one
does not know the extent of free riding of other players, Trust games in which one does not know
the likelihood that the other player will return some of the pie transferred to him, or Centipede
games where one does not know when the other player will stop the game. Another source of
uncertainty is the possibility that subjects make decisions with error, as predicted in Quantal
Response Equilibria. Harrison [1987] and Harrison and Rutström [2008; §3.6] consider the use of
controls for risk attitudes in bidding in first-price auctions.
In some cases, however, we simply want to elicit a preference from choices that do not
depend on the choices made by others in a strategic sense, but which still depend on risk attitudes in
a certain sense. An example due to Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008a] is the elicitation
of individual discount rates. In this case it is the concavity of the utility function that is important,
and under EUT that is synonymous with risk attitudes. Thus the risk aversion task is just a
(convenient) vehicle to infer utility over deterministic outcomes. The implication is that we should
combine a risk elicitation task with a time preference elicitation task, and use them jointly to infer
discount rates over utility.
19 See Keller and Strazzera [2002; p. 148] and Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue [2002;
p.381ff.] for an explicit statement of this assumption, which is often implicit in applied work. We refer to risk
aversion and concavity of the utility function interchangeably, but it is concavity that is central (the two can
differ for non-EUT specifications).
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A. Defining Discount Rates in Terms of Utility
Assume EUT holds for choices over risky alternatives and that discounting is exponential. A
subject is indifferent between two income options Mt and Mt+J if and only if
U(T+Mt) + (1/(1+*)J) U(T) = U(T) + (1/(1+*)J) U(T+Mt+J) (6)
where U(T+Mt) is the utility of monetary outcome Mt for delivery at time t plus some measure of
background consumption T, * is the discount rate, J is the horizon for delivery of the later
monetary outcome at time t+J, and the utility function U is separable and stationary over time. The
left hand side of equation (6) is the sum of the discounted utilities of receiving the monetary
outcome Mt at time t (in addition to background consumption) and receiving nothing extra at time
t+J, and the right hand side is the sum of the discounted utilities of receiving nothing over
background consumption at time t and the outcome Mt+J (plus background consumption) at time
t+J. Thus (6) is an indifference condition and * is the discount rate that equalizes the present value
of the utility of the two monetary outcomes Mt and Mt+J, after integration with an appropriate level
of background consumption T.
Most analyses of discounting models implicitly assume that the individual is risk neutral,19 so
that (6) is instead written in the more familiar form
Mt = (1/(1+*)J) Mt+J (7)
where * is the discount rate that makes the present value of the two monetary outcomes Mt and Mt+J
equal.
To state the obvious, (6) and (7) are not the same. As one relaxes the assumption that the
decision maker is risk neutral, it is apparent from Jensen’s Inequality that the implied discount rate
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decreases if U(M) is concave in M. Thus one cannot infer the level of the individual discount rate
without knowing or assuming something about their risk attitudes. This identification problem
implies that risk attitudes and discount rates cannot be estimated based on discount rate experiments
alone, but separate tasks to identify the influence of risk preferences must also be implemented.
Thus there is a clear implication from theory to experimental design: you need to know the
non-linearity of the utility function before you can conceptually define the discount rate. There is also a
clear implication for econometric method: you need to jointly estimate the parameters of the utility
function and the discount rate, to ensure that sampling errors in one propagate correctly to sampling
errors of the other. In other words, if we know the parameters of the utility function less precisely,
due to small samples or poor parametric specifications, we have to use methods that reflect the
effect of that imprecision on our estimates of discount rates. 
Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008a] do this, and infer discount rates for the adult
Danish population that are well below those estimated in the previous literature that assumed risk
neutrality, such as Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002], who estimated annualized rates of 28.1% for
the same target population. Allowing for concave utility, they obtain a point estimate of the discount
rate of 10.1%, which is significantly lower than the estimate of 25.2% for the same sample assuming
linear utility. This does more than simply verify that discount rates and risk aversion coefficients are
mathematical substitutes in the sense that either of them have the effect of lowering the influence
from future payoffs on present utility. It tells us that, for risk aversion coefficients that are
reasonable from the standpoint of explaining choices in the lottery choice task, the estimated
discount rate takes on a value that is much more in line with what one would expect from market
interest rates. To evaluate the statistical significance of adjusting for a concave utility function one
can test the hypothesis that the estimated discount rate assuming risk aversion is the same as the
discount rate estimated assuming risk neutrality. This null hypothesis is easily rejected. Thus, allowing
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for risk aversion makes a significant difference to the elicited discount rates.
B. The Need for Joint Estimation
We can write out the likelihood function for the choices that our subjects made and jointly
estimate the risk parameter r in equation (1) and the discount rate *. We use the same stochastic
error specification as Holt and Laury [2002], and the contribution to the overall likelihood from the
risk aversion responses is given by (5'). 
A similar specification is employed for the discount rate choices. Equation (3) is replaced by
the discounted utility of each of the two options, conditional on some assumed discount rate, and
equation (4) is defined in terms of those discounted utilities instead of the expected utilities. The
discounted utility of Option A is given by
PVA = (T+MA)(1!r) + (1/(1+*)J) T(1!r) (8)
and the discounted utility of Option B is
PVB = T(1!r) + (1/(1+*)J) (T+MB)(1!r) (9)
where MA and MB are the monetary amounts in the choice tasks presented to subjects, illustrated in
Table 2, and the utility function is assumed to be stationary over time.
An index of the difference between these present values, conditional on r and *, can then be
defined as
LPV = PVB1/0 / (PVA1/0 + PVB1/0) (10)
where 0 is a noise parameter for the discount rate choices, just as : was a noise parameter for the
risk aversion choices. It is not obvious that :=0, since these are cognitively different tasks. Our own
priors are that the risk aversion tasks are harder, since they involve four outcomes compared to two
outcomes in the discount rate tasks, so we would expect :>0. Error structures are things one
should always be agnostic about since they capture one’s modeling ignorance, and we allow the error
20 For simplicity we are implicitly assuming that the 8 parameter from Andersen, Harrison, Lau and
Rutström [2008a] is equal to 1. This means that delayed experimental income is spent in one day. 
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terms to differ between the risk and discount rate tasks.
Thus the likelihood of the discount rate responses, conditional on the EUT, CRRA and
exponential discounting specifications being true, depend on the estimates of r, *, : and 0, given the
assumed value of T and the observed choices.20 If we ignore the responses that reflect indifference,
the conditional log-likelihood is
ln L (r, *, :, 0; y, T, X) = 3i [ (ln M(LPV)×I(yi=1)) + (ln (1-M(LPV))×I(yi=!1)) ] (11)
where yi =1(!1) again denotes the choice of Option B (A) in discount rate task i, and X is a vector
of individual characteristics.
The joint likelihood of the risk aversion and discount rate responses can then be written as
ln L (r, *, :, 0; y, T, X) = ln LRA + ln LDR (12)
where LRA is defined by (5N) and LDR is defined by (11). This expression can then be maximized
using standard numerical methods.
4. Lessons Learned
We draw together some methodological and practical lessons we have learned from our
research into risk and time preferences in Denmark. These are often reflections on our experience
over many years in considering how theory, experimental design and econometrics inform and
constrain each other.
21 And hence that we can safely dismiss the messy claims of behaviorists as artefacts of the lab. We
might agree with this conclusion even if we do not agree with this argument for it (Harrison [2010]).
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A. The Role of Artefactual Field Experiments
Harrison and List [2004] go to great lengths to point out that field experiments often entail
many changes compared to traditional laboratory experiments. Sample composition, type of
commodity, environment, information, stakes, literacy, and so on. When one observes differences in
behavior in the field compared to the lab, which of these is driving that difference? Or, how do we
know that there are not offsetting effects from different components of the field environment? For
some inferential purposes we don’t care about this sort of decomposition, but all too often we care
deeply. The reason is that the “story” or “spin” that is put on the difference in behavior has to do
with some structural component of the theory explaining behavior. For example, the claim in some
quarters that people exhibit more rational behavior in the field, and that irrationality is primarily
confined to the lab.21 Or that people exhibit apparent altruism in the lab but rarely in the field. Or
that “market interactions” fix all evils of irrationality. These are overstatements, but are not too far
from the sub-plot of recent literature.
The critical role of “artefactual field experiments,” as Harrison and List [2004] call them, is
to take the simplest conceptual step over the bridge from the lab to the field: vary the composition
of the sample from the convenience sample of university students. Although conceptually simple,
the implementation is not always simple, particularly if one wants to generate representative samples
of a large population as distinct from studying well-defined sub-samples that mass conveniently at
trade shows or other locations. Whether these are best characterized as being lab experiments or
field experiments is not, to us, the real issue: the key thing is to see this type of experiment along a
continuum taking one from the lab to the field, to better understand behavior.
To illustrate this path, consider the evaluation of risk attitudes in the field. Our field
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experiments in Denmark, reviewed in section 2, illustrate well the issues involved in taking the first
step away from the lab. But to go further entails more than just “leaving the classroom” and
recruiting outside of a university setting. In terms of sample composition, it means finding subjects
who deal with that type of uncertainty in varying degrees, and trying to measure the extent of their
field experience with uncertainty. Moreover, it means developing stimuli that more closely match
those that the subjects have previously experienced, so that they can use whatever heuristics they
have developed for that commodity when making their choices. Finally, it means developing ways of
communicating probabilities that correspond with language that is familiar to the subject. Thus, field
experimentation in this case ultimately involves several simultaneous changes from the lab setting
with respect to subject recruitment and the development of stimuli that match the field setting.
Examples of studies that do these things, to varying degrees, are Harrison, List and Towe [2007] and
Fiore, Harrison, Hughes and Rutström [2009]. In each case the changes were, by design, partial, so
that one could better understand the effect on behavior. This is the essence of control that leads us
to use experimental methods, after all.
To see the concern with going into the field from the lab, consider the importance of
“background risk” for the attitudes towards a specific “foreground risk” that are elicited. In many
field settings it is simply not possible to artificially identify attitudes towards one risk source without
worrying about how the subjects view that risk as being correlated with other risks. For example,
mortality risks from alternative occupations tend to be highly correlated with morbidity risks: what
doesn’t kill you, sadly, often injures you. It is implausible to ask subjects their attitude toward one
risk without some coherent explanation in the instructions as to why a higher or lower level of that
risk would not be associated with a higher or lower risk of the other. In general this will not be
something that is amenable to field investigation in a controlled manner, although a few exceptions
exist, as illustrated by Harrison, List and Towe [2007].
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In a similar vein, there is a huge literature on how one can use laboratory experiments to
calibrate hypothetical field surveys for “hypothetical bias” in valuations: see Harrison [2006] for a
review. In this case the value of the complementarity of field and lab is not due to concerns about
the artefactual nature of the lab, but it is rather the artefactual nature of the field commodity that is
causing problems. For example, when someone asks you your willingness to pay $100 to reduce the
risk of global warming, how should you interpret what you are actually buying? There is simply no
way to run a naturally-occurring field experiment in this case, or in any way that is free of major
confounds. So evidence of hypothetical bias in many, disparate private goods experiments can be
used to condition the responses obtained in the field. For example, if women always respond
identically in hypothetical and real lab experiments, and men state valuations that are always double
what they would if it were real, then  one surely has some basis for adjusting field hypothetical
responses if one knows the sex of the respondent. The notion of calibration, introduced in this area
by Blackburn, Harrison and Rutrström [1994], formalizes the statistical process of adjusting the field
survey responses for the priors that one obtains in the lab environment.
B. The Contrived Debate Between Lab and Field Experiments
A corollary of the case for artefactual field experiments is the case for the complementarity
of laboratory and field experiments. This theme was front and center in Harrison and List [2004],
but appears to have been lost in some subsequent commentaries selling field experimental
methodology. One illustration of this complementarity comes from our work and is motivated by
the view that theory, experimental design and econometrics are dependant, resulting in numerous
auxiliary hypotheses that can most efficiently be investigated in the lab. It is often unwieldy and
inefficient to test procedures and treatments completely in the field, even if one would like to do so.
The efficient mix is to identify the important treatments for application in the field, and address the
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less important ones in the laboratory. Of course this involves some judgement about what is
important, but we are often guided there by theory, previous evidence, the need for econometric
identification, and, yes, one’s nose for what sells in the journals. We have been careful in our own
work to consider the balance between lab and field carefully at the outset. We expect that many
others will do the same, so that the tendency to present field experiments as universally superior to
lab experiments will organically shrink.
There are several examples of this complementarity from our work. In one case we used the
laboratory to evaluate the performance of the iMPL elicitation procedure we assumed in the field. In
the lab we could consider controlled comparisons to alternative methods, and see what biases might
have been generated by using the iMPL (see Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2006a]). It
would simply have been inefficient to carry all of those variants into the field.
In another example, we were concerned about the possibility of sample selection into
experiments on the basis of risk attitudes: the so-called “randomization bias” much discussed in the
broader experimental literature. If subjects know that participation in experiments might entail
randomization to treatment, and they have heterogeneous risk attitudes, then one would a priori
expect to see less risk averse subjects in experiments. But in experimental economics we offset that
with a fixed, non-stochastic show-up fee, so what is the net effect? To be honest, we only thought of
this after running our previous generation of field experiments, but could quickly evaluate the
obvious experimental design in the lab with the same instruments (see Harrison, Lau and Rutström
[2009]). Finding evidence of sample selection, we now build the obvious design checks into the next
generation of our field experiments.
C. Danes Are Like Plain Yogurt, Not Like Wines Or Cheeses
We are well aware that results for Denmark, as important as they are for Danish policy, and
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perhaps also methodologically, might not readily transfer to other populations. In our case much of
our non-Danish work has involved developing countries, and the differences there can be dramatic.
We would expect to see greater heterogeneity, greater instability, and perhaps even greater variety in
the types of decision-making models employed. In this respect, however, we stress that the tools we
have developed may be generally applied.
To take one important example, consider what one might mean by the “stability” of risk
preferences over time. Does this mean that the unconditional estimate of RRA for each subject is
the same over time, that the distribution for a given population stays the same even if individuals
pop up at different parts of the distribution from time to time, or that the RRA or distribution are
stable functions of observable states of nature that might change over time? In the latter case, where
we think of states of nature as homely and intelligible things such as health, marital status, and family
composition, it could be that preferences are a stable function of those states, but appear to be
unstable when evaluated unconditionally. Using a longitudinal field experimental design, we
examined exactly this question in Denmark (Anderson, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008b]). We
found that preferences were generally stable, with some caveats, in virtually all three senses. But is
this just a reflection of the “plain yogurt” of Danish culture, or something more general? Our
personal priors may tell us one thing, but only data from new experiments can verify if this is true.
But the point is that the longitudinal methodology, and questionnaires on states of nature, is a
general approach applicable beyond the specific population of Denmark.
D. Non-EUT Models of Risky Choice and Non-Exponential Models of Discounting: Festine
Lente
We have serious doubts about the generality and robustness of some of the empirical claims
of the literature with respect to risk and time preferences. Much of the empirical evidence has been
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obtained by staring at “patterns” of choices rather than estimating structural parameters and testing
for statistical significance. It is quite possible for there to be statistically significant differences in
patterns of choices, according to some unconditional semi-parametric test, but for that to be
consistent with a wide range of underlying structural models. This is particularly true when one
augments those models with alternative “behavioral error” stories. To take one simple example, the
violations of first-order stochastic dominance that motivated the shift from original prospect theory
to cumulative prospect theory can, to some extent, be accounted for by certain error specifications.
One might not want to do that, and we are not advocating it as a general econometric policy, but the
point is that inferences about patterns is not the same as inferences about the latent structural
parameters.
Another issue with much of the received evidence for violations of EUT or exponential
discounting is that it has been drawn from convenience samples in laboratory experiments.
Relatively little evidence has been collected from field experiments with a broader sample from the
population, using comparable instruments and/or instruments that arise more naturally in the
decision-making environments of the subjects. We are not denying that “students are people too,”
just noting that they have distinct set of demographic characteristics that can matter significantly for
policy inferences (e.g., Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2010]), and that all exhibit one
characteristic that might reflect sample selection on unobservables of relevance for the experimental
task at hand (viz., their presence at a college or university).
Finally, our work leads us to question some of the inferential assumptions of previous tests.
Mixture specifications, in which one allows two or more data-generating processes to explain
observed behavior, show clear evidence that behavior is not wholly explained by any one of the
popular models. Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2008a; §3.D] consider a mixture
specification of exponential and hyperbolic discounting, and find that 72% of the choices are better
22 Those experiments employed a Front End Delay on payments of 30 days, and were not designed
to test Quasi-Hyperbolic specifications. The latest series of field experiments in Denmark, completed late
2009, are designed to test that specification inter alia.
23 For example, does one constrain individuals or task types to be associated with just one data-
generating process, or allow each choice to come from either? Does one consider more than two types of
processes, using some specification rule to decide if there are 2, or 3, or more? Does one specify general
models for each data-generating process and see if one of them collapses to a special case, or just specify the
competing alternatives explicitly from the outset? How does one check for global maximum likelihood
estimates in an environment that might generate multi-modal likelihood functions “naturally”? Harrison and
Rutström [2009] discuss these issues, and point to the older literature.
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characterized as exponential.22 This estimate of the mixing probability is statistically significantly
different from 0 or 50%. Similarly, Harrison and Rutström [2009] find roughly equal support for
EUT and Prospect Theory in a lab setting; Harrison, Humphrey and Verschoor [2009] find roughly
equal support for EUT and Rank-Dependent Utility models in artefactual field experiments in India,
Ethiopia and Uganda; and Coller, Harrison and Rutström [2010] find roughly equal support for
exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting in the laboratory.
The key insight from mixture specifications is to simply change the question that is posed to
the data. Previous econometric analyses have posed a proper question: if one and only one data-
generating process is to account for these data, what are the estimated parameter values and do they
support a non-standard specification? The simplest, finite mixture specification changes this to: if
two data-generating processes are allowed to account for the data, what fraction is attributable to
each, and what are the estimated parameter values? So stated, one can imagine someone still wanting
to ask the former question, if they just wanted one “best” model. But that question is also seen to
constrain evidence of heterogeneity of decision-making processes, and we prefer to avoid that when
we can. There are fascinating issues with the specific implementation and interpretation of mixture
models, but those are not germane to the main insight they provide.23
Finally, there are often simple issues of functional specification which can only be explored
with structural models. For example, what happens when subjects bring an unobserved
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“homegrown reference point” to the experimental task and the analyst tries to infer measures of loss
aversion? In other words, what if the subject rationally expects to get more than just the show-up
fee? The answer is that one gets extremely sensitive estimates of loss aversion depending on what
one assumes, not too surprisingly (e.g., Harrison and Rutström [2008; §3.2.3]). This is likely to be a
more serious issue in the field, due to a greater diversity in homegrown reference points. As another
example, some tests of EUT rest on the assumption that subjects use a very restrictive functional
form. The tests of myopic loss aversion offered in Gneezy and Potters [1997] rest on assuming
CRRA, and their “violations of EUT” can be accounted for simply with an expo-power specification
that allows varying RRA with prize level (e.g., Harrison and Rutström [2008; §3.7]). So the initial
evidence does show a violation of CRRA, but that is not something one ought to get too excited
about.
We do not want to overstate the case for standard specifications. We do find some evidence
for some subjects to behave differently than typically assumed in EUT and exponential discounting
specifications, in some tasks. It is just that the evidence is hardly as monolithic as many claim.
E. Estimation, Not Direct Elicitation
When we began our research we were focused on designing instruments that could directly
provide more precise estimates of risk attitudes and temporal preferences. Our work on the iMPL,
discussed earlier, was directly solely at that objective: refining down the interval within which we had
captured the true, latent risk attitude or discount rate. We certainly believe that those procedures
accomplish that goal, but our focus quickly moved away from designing a better mousetrap to
learning more about the mouse itself. That is, we discovered that the questions we wanted to ask
demanded that we employ structural estimation, if for no other reason than to be able to condition
inferences from the discount rate task with estimates of the utility function (from the risk aversion
24 There is no intended slight of models of decision-making under risk that focus on things other
than the linearity of the utility function: this point is quite general.
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task). This need for joint estimation, and full information maximum likelihood recognition that
errors in estimation of the utility function should propagate into errors in estimation of discount
rates, as a matter of theory as well as econometric logic, is much more general than these examples.
Inferences about bidding in auctions, about subjective beliefs elicited from a proper scoring rule,
about social preferences, and behavior in games with payoffs defined over utility, all require that one
say something about utility functions unless one is working on special cases. Indeed, there is
mounting evidence that the inferences change dramatically when one allows for non-linear utility
functions.24 The day of designing tasks to elicit exactly what one wants in one task are long over.
F. Virtual Experiments As A Smooth Bridge Between the Lab and the Field
It is now well-known and accepted that behavior is sensitive to the cognitive constraints of
participants. It has been recognized for some time that field referents and cues are essential elements
in the decision process, and can serve to overcome such constraints (Ortmann and Gigerenzer
[1997]), even if there are many who point to “frames” as the source of misbehavior from the
perspective of traditional economic theory (Kahneman and Tversky [2000]). The concept of
“ecological rationality” captures the essential idea of those who see heuristics as potentially valuable
decision tools (Gigerenzer and Todd [1999], Smith [2003]). According to this view, cognition has
evolved within specific decision environments. If that evolution is driven by ecological fitness then
the resulting cognitive structures, such as decision heuristics, are efficient and accurate within these
environments. But they may often fail when applied to new environments.
At least two other research programs develop similar views. Glimcher [2003] describes a
research program, following Marr [1982], that argues for understanding human decision making as a
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function of a complete biological system rather than as a collection of mechanisms. As a biological
system he views decision making functions as having evolved to be fit for specific environments.
Clark [1997] sees cognition as extended outside not just the brain but the entire human body,
defining it in terms of all the tools used in the cognitive process, both internal and external to the
body. Field cues can be considered external aspects of such a process. Behavioral economists are
paying attention to these research programs and what they imply for the understanding of the
interactions between the decision maker and his environment. For our purposes here, it means we
have to pay careful attention to the role of experiential learning in the presence of specific field cues
and how this influences decisions. 
The acceptance of the role of field cues in cognition provides arguments in favor of field
rather than lab experiments (Harrison and List [2004]). Where else than in field experiments can you
study decision makers in their natural environment using field cues that they have come to depend
on? We actually challenge this view, if it is taken to argue that the laboratory environment is
necessarily unreliable (Levitt and List [2007]). While it is true that lab experiments traditionally use
artefactual and stylized tasks that are free of field cues, in order to generate the type of control that is
seen as essential to hypothesis testing, field experiments have other weaknesses that a priori are
equally important to recognize (Harrison [2005]). Most importantly, the ability to implement
necessary controls on experimental conditions in the field is much more limited than in the lab, as is
the ability to implement many counterfactual scenarios. In addition, recruitment is often done in
such a way that it is difficult to avoid and control for sample selection effects; indeed, in many
instances the natural process of selection provides the very treatment of interest (e.g., Harrison and
List [2008]). However, that means that one must take the sample with all of the unobservables that it
might have selected on, and just assume that they did not interact with the behavior being measured.
Finally, the cost of generating observational data can be quite significant in the field, at least in
-44-
comparison to the lab.
For all these reasons we again see lab and field experiments as complementary, a persistent
theme of Harrison and List [2004]. A proper understanding of decision making requires the use of
both. While lab experiments are better at generating internal validity, imposing the controlled
conditions necessary for hypothesis testing, field experiments are better at generating external
validity, including the natural field cues.
Fiore, Harrison, Hughes and Rutström [2009] propose a new experimental environment, the
Virtual Experiment (VX), that has the potential of generating both the internal validity of lab
experiments and the external validity of field experiments. A VX is an experiment set in a controlled
lab-like environment, using either typical lab or field participants, that generates synthetic field cues
using Virtual Reality (VR) technology. The experiment can be taken to typical field samples, such as
experts in some decision domain, or to typical lab samples, such as student participants. The VX
environment can generate internal validity since it is able to closely mimic explicit and implicit
assumptions of theoretical models, and thus provide tight tests of theory; it is also able to replicate
conditions in past experiments for robustness tests of auxiliary assumptions or empirically generated
hypotheses. The VX environment can generate external validity because observations can be made
in an environment with cues mimicking those occurring in the field. In addition, any dynamic
scenarios can be presented in a realistic and physically consistent manner, making the interaction
seem natural for the participant. Thus the VX builds a bridge between the lab and the field, allowing
the researcher to smoothly go from one to the other and see what features of each change behavior.
VX is a methodological frontier enabling new levels of understanding via integration of laboratory
and field research in ways not previously possible. Echoing calls by others for such an integration,
we argue that “research must be conducted in various settings, ranging from the artificial laboratory,
through the naturalistic laboratory, to the natural environment itself” (Hoffman and Deffenbacher
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[1993; p. 343]).
The potential applications for VX are numerous. Apart from simulating actual policy
scenarios, such as the wild fire prevention policies investigated by Fiore et al. [2009], it can also be
used to mimic environments assumed in a number of field data analyses. For example, popular ways
of estimating valuations for environmental goods include the Travel Cost Method (TCM), the
Hedonic Pricing Method (HPM), and the Stated Choice Method (SCM). To mimic TCM the
simulation can present participants with different travel alternatives and observe which ones are
chosen under different naturalistic conditions. To mimic HPM the simulation can present
participants with different real estate options and observe purchasing behavior, or simply observe
pricing behavior for alternative options (Castronova [2004]). Finally, to mimic SCM participants can
experience the different options they are to choose from through naturalistic simulation. For all of
these types of scenarios, some of the most powerful applications of VX will involve continuous
representations of dynamically generated effects of policy changes. Visualizing and experiencing
long-term effects correctly should improve short-run decisions with long-run consequences.
In the application to wild fire prevention policies we use actual choices by subjects that bear
real economic consequences from those choices. Participants are presented with two options: one
simply continues the present fire prevention policies, and the other increases the use of prescribed
burns. Participants get to experience two fire seasons under each policy and are then asked to make
a choice between them. The scenario that simulates the continuation of the present fire prevention
policies will realistically generate fires that cause more damage on average and that also vary
substantially in intensity. This option therefore presents the participant with a risky gamble with low
expected value. The alternative option presents a relatively safe gamble with a higher expected value,
but there will be a non-stochastic cost involved in implementing the expansion of prescribed burns.
It is possible in VX to set the payoff parameters in such a way that one can estimate Willingness To
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Pay (WTP) for the burn expansion option that is informative to actual fire policy. These values of
WTP could then be compared to those generated through a popular Contingent Valuation Method
to test the hypothesis that they should be different. Alternatively, it is possible to manipulate the
payoff parameters in such a way that one estimates parameters of choice models such as risk
attitudes, loss aversion, and probability weights.
In summary, we see the use of VX as a new tool in experimental economics, with an
emphasis on the methodological issues involved in bridging the gap between lab and field
experiments.
5. Conclusions
We love doing experimental economics because it provides a unique ability to directly and
explicitly confront theorists and econometricians with real behavior. There is no hiding behind
theoretical models that claim to be operationally meaningful but never really come close, and there is
no hiding behind proxies for variables of theoretical interest when the experimental design is
developed rigorously. This work requires modest extensions of the tools used by experimental
economists, to develop designs that employ several tasks to identify all of the moving parts of the
theoretical machine, and to write out the likelihood of observed behavior using the structural model
being tested, but these are feasible and well-understood components of modern experimental
economics.
It is then natural to combine laboratory and field experiments in this enterprise. When we
think of new areas of our own research, such as the elicitation of subjective beliefs and the
measurement of aversion to uncertainty, we would never think of first developing experimental
designs in the field. Actually, this is also true of older areas of research which we believe to be often
intractably confounded in the field, such as “social preferences,” “trust” and “loss aversion,” but our
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premiss there is apparently not widely shared. In any event, the efficient frontier for this production
process demands that we combine laboratory and field environments. They can be substituted to
varying degrees, of course, but it is difficult for us to imagine an area of enquiry that would not
benefit from some inputs of both.
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Lottery B and T=0
Lottery A Lottery B
p DKK p DKK p DKK p DKK
0.1 2000 0.9 1600 0.1 3850 0.9 100 1640 475 1165 -4, -1.71 
0.2 2000 0.8 1600 0.2 3850 0.8 100 1680 850 830 -1.71, -0.95
0.3 2000 0.7 1600 0.3 3850 0.7 100 1720 1225 495 -0.95, -0.49
0.4 2000 0.6 1600 0.4 3850 0.6 100 1760 1600 160 -0.49, -0.15
0.5 2000 0.5 1600 0.5 3850 0.5 100 1800 1975 -175 -0.15, 0.14
0.6 2000 0.4 1600 0.6 3850 0.4 100 1840 2350 -510 0.14, 0.41
0.7 2000 0.3 1600 0.7 3850 0.3 100 1880 2725 -845 0.41, 0.68
0.8 2000 0.2 1600 0.8 3850 0.2 100 1920 3100 -1180 0.68, 0.97
0.9 2000 0.1 1600 0.9 3850 0.1 100 1960 3475 -1515 0.97, 1.37
1 2000 0 1600 1 3850 0 100 2000 3850 -1850 1.37, 4
Note: The last four columns in this table, showing the expected values of the lotteries and the implied CRRA intervals,
were not shown to subjects.
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